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6 H A S K I N S & S E L L S January 
Invisible Management 
P R E S E N T - D A Y practices in the field of corporate organization and finance, 
as evidenced by a number of reorganiza-
tions and refinancings during the past year, 
recently have come under fire. 
Professor W . Z . Ripley, of Harvard 
University, speaking not long ago before 
the annual meeting of the Academy of 
Political Science, took occasion to make a 
vigorous attack on what he termed a ten-
dency to "the alarming divorce of the 
ownership of property, represented by 
securities emitted by corporations or trus-
tees, from any direct accountability 
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whatsoever for its prudent and efficient 
management." H e declared that the con-
centration of voting stock in new corpora-
tions in the hands of "banker-promoters," 
together with the ever widening diffusion 
of non-voting stock among small investors, 
was resulting in "the assumption of an 
irresponsible control by intermediaries," 
and rendering helpless millions of these 
small investors. 
Professor Ripley's argument is as fol-
lows : 
" . . . A l l kinds of private businesses 
are being bought up by banking houses, 
and new corporations are being substi-
tuted for the old in order that the pur-
chase price (and more) may be recovered 
by sale of shares to the general public.. 
But the significant change is that the new 
stock thus sold is entirely bereft of any 
voting power, except in case of actual or 
impending bankruptcy. General stock-
holders, to be sure, have always been in-
ert, delegating most of their powers of 
election, but at worst they might always 
be stimulated to assert themselves. Under 
the new style of corporation such general 
stockholders are badly deprived of all 
rights in this direction and new preferred 
stocks are sold up to the hilt of the value 
of the assets, if not beyond. The issues 
are called preferred stocks. They are 
really bonds. And instead, as formerly, of 
being limited to a half or two-thirds of the 
tangible assets, no limit is now set except 
the powers of absorption of the investing 
public. 
" . . . There is no concealment about 
it. Practically every prospectus concludes 
by a statement that the business wi l l con-
tinue to be managed by those who have 
brought it to its present high pitch of 
profitableness. But who, may we ask, has 
given a hostage to fortune for honest and 
economic management of the business? 
The promoters stand to lose only the 
amount of their stake—a minus quantity 
in dollars, leaving aside, of course, the 
moral obligation. It is the public stock-
holders who stand to lose their all, in case 
of misdirection. And most of them have 
parted with any hope of participation in 
future profits over and above their fixed 
return, by agreement in the subscription 
to forfeit all 'pre-emptive' rights in the 
issue of new stock. H o w can there be 
other than a whirlwind of abuse of power 
under such conditions?" 
Control over large corporations always 
has tended to be vested in the hands of a 
few. Small stockholders, by and large, 
have no hand in the direction. They are 
not desirous of exercising functions of 
management, nor are they qualified to do 
so. Their interest lies primarily in re-
ceiving dividends and in preserving the 
safety of their investment and seeing its 
value increase. Consequently, far less than 
half of the capital stock in the hands of 
a small concentrated group of holders may 
constitute as effective an instrument of 
control as an actual majority of shares. 
It is true there have been rare instances 
where small stockholders have pooled 
their interests in a voting trust in sufficient 
numbers to make their influence felt in 
avenging a common grievance. The fact 
remains, nevertheless, that the average 
small stockholder is not interested directly 
in the management of his company. 
The present movement is a recognition 
of the actual status of the small stock-
holder essentially as either an investor or 
a speculator. Accordingly, he is issued 
non-voting shares, and the voting power is 
concentrated in the hands of those exer-
cising the real control. There is this dif-
ference, however: the small stockholder, 
being bereft of potential voting power, is 
precluded from forming a combination 
with others in his class to assert his rights 
should occasion require. For the efficient 
and safe management of the business he 
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must rely upon the ability and integrity 
of those in possession of the voting shares. 
It is this situation which, according to 
Professor Ripley's view, is resulting in an 
abuse of power. H i s contention is that 
while the non-voting shares, representing 
the bulk of the actual ownership of the 
corporation, are tending to wide distribu-
tion among the public, the voting shares, 
representing the real control over the cor-
poration, are tending to concentration in 
the hands of "banker-promoters" who 
paid nothing for them and who have no 
financial interest in the company. Owner-
ship is being divorced from management; 
ergo, the result is an abuse of power. 
"It is questioned whether Professor Rip-
ley's statements are not too sweeping. 
It is doubted whether there is such a pro-
nounced trend toward separation between 
ownership and management as he would 
have us believe there is. Admitting the 
concentration of voting stocks in the hands 
of a few, it is nevertheless true that in 
most of our large corporations those own-
ing such stocks have also a large financial 
interest in their respective companies. 
It is true that a number of important 
reorganizations and refinancings have been 
promoted by bankers recently, in which 
the bankers have emerged with the control 
of the corporations in question. However, 
it is by no means certain that this situa-
tion is resulting in the irresponsibility and 
abuse which Professor Ripley decries. 
The era of "fly-by-night" promoters has 
passed. And, even though it is not claimed 
that the millennium is at hand, and it is 
recognized that there are black sheep in 
every flock, nevertheless it is submitted 
that the banking fraternity as a whole is 
composed of able and upright men, who 
are mindful of a sense of fiduciary account-
ability to the millions of investor-owners, 
rather than giddy with a feeling of power. 
Can the moral obligation be waved aside 
as nonchalantly as Professor Ripley has 
disposed of it? 
Aside from altruistic motives, these 
bankers are selfishly interested in the en-
terprises which they promote. They have 
a selfish interest in maintaining the prop-
erty, for the sake of earning for themselves 
future dividends on their stockholdings, 
and for the sake of increasing the value 
of their shares so that they later may be 
disposed of at a profit. A n d beyond this, 
it undeniably is to their interest to direct 
the enterprises wisely in order to protect 
their own reputation and assure themselves 
future business. A disastrous adventure 
would mean the destruction of public con-
fidence in the bankers, with decidedly i l l 
consequences to themselves. 
Further, this control by bankers fre-
quently has a salutary effect on those re-
sponsible for the active management of a 
corporation. Obviously, bankers are in-
terested in operating the business at a 
profit. In a number of instances assump-
tion of control by them has had the effect 
of teaching the management how to con-
duct the business efficiently and profitably. 
Building. 
